Results of a research project with household-level data on the demographic impact of genocide and civil war in Rwanda are reported. The survey includes demographic and criminological data on 352 peasant households that were part of a large household survey project before the genocide. The absolute number of Hutu killed in the sample is half of the number of Tutsi killed. The statistical and econometric results show that the killing pattern among Hutu and Tutsi was different; Tutsi members of the same household were often killed on the same day and in the same place. The effect of the arrival of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at the survey sites on the survival chances of Hutu and Tutsi is estimated.
The lack of empirical research has everything to do with the great number of difficulties that one faces when undertaking this journey. To name just a few obstacles that have to be tackled: many people are traumatized by the events, people distrust one another, ethnicity is not used in official parlance but is omnipresent in daily life, the struggle for life encourages the search for short-term gain and corruption, the ongoing war in the Congo cuts short any political opening of debate, more than 100,000 people (many without file or charges) are in prison, and so on.
Despite these difficulties, this study presents demographic findings about the transition of rural households from a period of civil war and genocide to a situation of relative peace. Findings are based on intensive household survey research. The study is the result of 8 months of field research in Rwanda over a period of 2 years. It will enable us to test the double-genocide thesis empirically for parts of the country. Because fieldwork was not conducted in the Kivu provinces of the Congo, empirical work on the massacres in Kivu is not presented.
With good data, one can, for example, analyze the impact of the RPF in surveyed communities and distinguish it from the impact of the forces that committed the genocide of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in these same communities. What is needed for this is a detailed data set with the dates, places, ethnic affiliation of the victims, and identity of the killer(s). This is, among other things, what this empirical study offers. The data allow us, for example, to observe whether the RPF made as many victims among Rwanda's (mostly) Hutu population as the genocide made among its (mostly) Tutsi population. The data also allow us to test statistically whether the arrival of the RPF saved lives or caused more deaths among Hutu and Tutsi.
Because of budget limitations and the design of the research project, this study is a limited test of the double-genocide thesis-specifically, of the prefectures of Gitarama, Gikongoro, and Kibuye. Advocates of the thesis may argue that it is not a true test of the double-genocide thesis because most of killings by the RPF occurred in Byumba, Kibungo, and rural Kigali. This criticism is partially correct. Therefore, I state at the beginning that the test is a partial one, namely, for parts of Rwanda (the three above-mentioned prefectures) and not for the entire country. It should be noted, however, that testimonies about killings organized by the RPF exist for several parts of Rwanda.
1 It is hoped that the advocates of the double-genocide thesis appreciate the empirical methodology and acknowledge its findings.
Before presenting the results of the fieldwork, we need to discuss the definition of genocide. First, the internationally accepted legal definition is set out in a United Nations Convention in 1948. Article 2 in the convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." The most important element in this definition is that it can be used-and is currently used-in national and international penal tribunals. Scholars, however, have singled out a number of problems with this definition. These problems are appar-ent when we study large-scale massacres that do not seem to correspond to a complete or full genocide. Researchers then have the choice of limiting their use of the word genocide to the very few cases in which there is absolutely no doubt that this word applies (e.g., the Nazi genocide of Jews) or broadening its use to cover large-scale massacres and take the risk of losing the power of the word. One can indeed argue that the term has this power when it is used to define just those events (such as the holocaust) that seem different from other large-scale massacres. This question also touches the core of the Rwandan situation. Very few scholars doubt the correctness of the application of the term genocide in its legal and broader meaning (in social science research) to the slaughter that occurred in Rwanda between April and June 1994. However, very few scholars will use the word genocide to describe the killings committed by the RPF before, during, and after 1994.
The purpose is not to have a legal discussion of the definition of genocide here; other authors have much more expertise to do that. I cannot avoid such a discussion, however, for two reasons. First, the advocates of the double-or triple-genocide thesis do use the word genocide and thus invoke the legal implications of its use.
2 Second, when I want to distinguish between a "complete" or "full" genocide, on one hand, and one or more massacres, on the other hand, I need a set of criteria that allow me to make a such distinction.
The question in the literature is whether the events that occurred in Rwanda between April and June 1994 are so exceptional that they merit description by a term not used to describe other kinds of killings. This is exactly where the main contribution of the study can be situated. I present empirical material to find out whether the killings committed by the Hutu power regime between April and June 1994 had a different character from the killings committed by the RPF in Rwanda before, during, and after 1994. Which term, then, is considered to be appropriate in its legal or broader social science meaning is open for debate.
THE TRACING METHODOLOGY OF THE GENOCIDE TRANSITION SURVEY
To research the fate of the members of Rwandan households in transition from civil war and genocide to a situation of relative peace, it was necessary to find and collect data at the household level. These data had to be unbiased; that is, whatever information on households one could find (e.g., income, household composition, location, farm size, etc.) should be collected independently of the behavior of household members during the genocide. This condition is not satisfied, for example, when one researches a sample of perpetrators or a sample of prisoners. Therefore, I decided to trace the rural households that were interviewed by Dan Clay from Michigan State University and the Department of Agricultural Statistics (DSA) before the genocide. Clay had interviewed 1,248 rural households from 1989 to 1992 in all Rwandan prefectures. He collected detailed data on the demographic, economic, and agricultural situation of farm households. This database is a unique source to study the livelihood of Rwandan peasants before the genocide. The research strategy would give the researcher data on the fate of rural households during and after the genocide, based on a pregenocide sample of rural households.
Clay had all household survey data computerized but could not provide a list of the location and the names of the surveyed households. Because the former regime and its allies had to evacuate Kigali in a hurry and did not have time to destroy their archives (they destroyed or stole the computers), I believed I had a small chance of finding the old surveys. Searching the archives in the ministries of agriculture, economic planning, and their respective statistics departments did not result in a list of the households. However, in August 1999, under a layer of dust in one of the archives, I finally found the original questionnaires with the location and the names of the heads of households mentioned on the first page. I found the references of 73% of the original surveyed households in that archive. From the 10 prefectures, 7 were nearly complete and 3 were nearly completely missing.
For reasons of budget limitations, however, I could not survey all 1,248 households. Survey research in general and in Rwanda in particular is very expensive and timeconsuming. In addition, a genocide transition survey is not free from security concerns. The genocide took place in 1994 but persists in Rwandan society today. In the summer of 2000, I decided to examine three prefectures totaling 352 households surveyed by Professor Clay. The prefectures chosen were Gitarama, Kibuye, and Gikongoro, with 160 households (10 clusters) in the first and 96 households (6 clusters) in the second and third prefectures. These prefectures were chosen for a variety of reasons. First, I had the information necessary to locate the households in these prefectures. Second, these areas were safer to work in compared to Ruhengeri or Gisenyi. Third, Imidugudu policy (villagization) had been implemented to a lesser degree in these prefectures than in Kibungo and rural Kigali, leaving more hope of finding the households at the same locations as before the war. Fourth, the prefectures had a mix of very "successful" genocide (Gikongoro and Kibuye) and less successful genocide (Gitarama). Fifth, the prefectures had had a sizable Tutsi population before the war. (This, however, only distinguishes them from the northern prefectures.) Sixth, the prefectures encompass both very poor and not so poor communes.
I had designed the questionnaires for the Genocide Transition Survey and had decided to proceed in two phases. A team of collaborators, selected at the National University of Rwanda in Butare (one for each commune, the equivalent of one for each cluster of 16 households), was to attempt to find the households in the indicated sectors. In the first stage, the collaborators were not to conduct a detailed questionnaire but to note only a limited amount of information. I wanted first to know whether we were able to trace the households in their original dwellings. The information to be collected in this first stage included the following:
• Can we locate at least one member of the household surveyed in 1989-1992? • Are the head of household and his wife alive or dead?
• What is the ethnic group of the head of household and his wife? The collaborators were told to approach the households in a prudent manner, taking time to explain that the research was for scientific purposes only and that we were not part of the Rwandan judiciary, the International Tribunal, or the government. In fact, if collaborators believed that households were not approachable, they could gather the information for this first stage of the project by talking to neighbors or government authorities. Because tracing of households requires extensive knowledge of the area of residence, I decided to work with collaborators from the communes. However, because this kind of work is potentially dangerous, I also decided not to take collaborators from the sector where the households were located but from a different sector within the commune. This would at least give a minimum guarantee of security, save transportation costs, and make local knowledge of the area of residence available to the researcher. Relying on earlier tracing done in Indonesia by Duncan, Frankenberg, and Smith (1998) , I decided to choose collaborators with a good knowledge of mathematics. Because the survey is a quantitative research project, collaborators with a good grasp of mathematics would be helpful not only in the tracing stage of the project (as they had been in Indonesia) but also in the actual filling out of the questionnaires.
After interviews to select collaborators, the following characteristics determined my choice:
• a good grasp of mathematics (in practice, this came down to having a university degree);
• having resided in the commune where the interviews take place before and during the genocide; • minimum age of 21;
• previous experience in survey research, especially interviewing; • able and willing to undertake survey research on the genocide; • whether the candidate-enumerator was on good terms with both the Tutsi and the Hutu population of his or her commune of origin.
For the first stage of the project, a 1-day training session was organized. Collaborators were told not to be satisfied with one source of information but to cross-check their information with members of either ethnic group. In the end, I employed 22 collaborators, one for each cluster of 16 households. Eighteen collaborators had a university degree or were about to finish their university studies. Four collaborators had taken teacher training during their high school studies and were currently teaching in primary schools. Of the collaborators, 8 were female and 14 were male. Collaborators came from both ethnic groups, and all originated from the communes where the survey was to be held.
The advantage of a tracing exercise is that the researcher has information on the households that is not available to the collaborators. The 1989-1992 database gave me a very good instrument to make sure that collaborators found the intended households. In addition to the data on the households, the researcher had another way of controlling the tracking done by the collaborators. During the 1989-1992 agricultural survey, the households were given a solid basket as a kind of reward for their cooperation with the survey. The collaborators were told to ask whether the household had received this item and if they still had it. After the first stage, the information supplied by the collaborators was checked with the database, and the researcher was able to criticize unfinished work. Collaborators were also informed that they would have an opportunity to correct information sheets when they returned to the households for the second stage of the project.
The 352 households in the prefectures of Gitarama, Kibuye, and Gikongoro that were interviewed by Clay and the DSA have more than 1,900 household members. In the first stage of the project, we managed to find information on 340 of these households and on 1,800 persons included in the 1989-1992 survey. This success may be attributed to the preparation of the tracing exercise and the constant presence in the field of the researcher, but it is also due to the organization of Rwandan society. Communal authorities have a detailed and well-organized record of all the inhabitants in each sector and cell. They carefully register every birth, death, or migration in or out of the commune. The success of the tracing exercise was also due to Rwandan culture: people on the hills know each other and know of each other's whereabouts. Even when a person is not present on the hill, neighbors have information about where he can be found. Having found information about 1,800 of the 1,900 original people in the survey does not mean that they were all present in their original dwellings, as will be documented in the tables.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM THE GENOCIDE TRANSITION SURVEY
During the Genocide Transition Survey (GTS), all survey sites included in the 1989-1992 survey in the three above-mentioned prefectures were revisited. The locations of the 10 clusters in Gitarama prefecture and the 6 clusters in the two other prefectures are listed in Table 1 .
During the GTS, we found information on 340 of the 352 original households: 155 in Gitarama, 96 in Gikongoro, and 89 in Kibuye. Twenty-seven households had a Tutsi head of the household. These households, on average, owned less land, had less cattle, and-in terms of adult equivalents-had the same gross income as Hutu households.
3 Table 4 gives an overview of the findings of the Genocide Transition Survey (GTS). We include 1,926 household members alive in March 1994. From these 1,926, we have registered the ethnicity in 1,795 cases. Of the household members for whom we were 4 Tutsi killed in the period from 1995 to 2000. Of all violent deaths of Tutsi, 85% were caused by execution by Interahamwe and 7.5% by soldiers of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR). The majority of violent deaths of Hutu (48%) were caused by execution by the RPF.
5
Of the registered violent deaths of Hutu, 21% had been executed by the Interahamwe. Although we reached a very high level of attrition (93.2%, 1,795 of 1,926) in our survey, we do not know whether a number of Hutu were still alive in 2000 because of their flight to the Congo (or how they had been killed). This means that in our sample, about 52% (79 of 151) of all Tutsi residing at the survey sites in March 1994 were killed in the weeks after April 6, 1994. The genocide of the Tutsi population has thus clearly left its traces in our sample. Another element of the mass slaughter campaign, traceable in our sample as well, is the killing of Hutu by the Interahamwe and the FAR, who account for 10 out of 43 registered violent deaths among Hutu. Thus, the 1994 genocide has also claimed 0.6% (10 of 1,620) of the lives of the Hutu in our sample. Furthermore, the RPF claimed (Hutu) lives, 21 to be exact, almost half of all violent deaths of Hutu, equaling 1.3% of the Hutu population residing in the survey sites.
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5. The term interahamwe is used as a general description for civilians taking part in attacks and killings, not strictly for Mouvement Republicain National pour le Dévéloppement (MRND)youth or organized militia. Table 5 presents data at the household level. It is shown that only 2 out of 27 Tutsi households did not lose one or more members due to violent death in genocide or civil war. This accounts for 7.5% of all Tutsi households and for 8.3% of Tutsi households with no information missing. In comparison, 191 out of 295 Hutu households did not lose any member because of genocide or civil war. This accounts for 64.7% of all Hutu households and for 91.8% of Hutu households with no information missing. It is important that we failed to register data on the status of life or death of one or more members in 87 (39 + 23 + 17 + 8) Hutu households. This is a large number, but it does not mean that the data we found on the other members of these households are incorrect. In effect, 72 out of these 87 households (83%) reported having not lost a member in violent death (missing persons were excluded). Adding this 72 to the 191 households mentioned above reveals that 89% of all Hutu households reported not having lost a member who died violently. Of course, the necessary reservations for the missing members in these 72 households must be taken into account. A large majority of the Tutsi in our sample, 67% to be exact, originated from the prefecture of Gitarama. Forty-three of the 104 Tutsi from Gitarama were killed in the genocide, 3 died after the genocide, and the fate of 6 Tutsi from Gitarama was not registered in the GTS. This means that almost half of the Tutsi, who were alive in March 1994 and living in Gitarama, survived the genocide. This, in effect, explains the relatively high overall survival percentage in our sample. The other prefectures show a totally different picture. Of the 28 Tutsi in our sample who we know were living in Gikongoro in March 1994, only 3 were still alive in 2000. The 25 others were killed in the genocide. This is a survival percentage of only 10.7%. The data for Gitarama confirm other research, particularly the seminal account of the genocide by Alison Des Forges (1999) , that the genocide in Gitarama was less intense (at least in the number of Tutsi killed) compared with other prefectures. Des Forges writes that the combined pressure by political and military authorities, militia, and the radio succeeded in destroying open opposition to the interim government and its genocidal program in Gitarama. But the killing campaign failed to exterminate all the Tutsi of the region, in part because Hutu officials and ordinary people continued to aid Tutsi, even if only furtively, and in part because the rapid assemblage of thousands of Tutsi at Kabgayi created an agglomeration protected by its sheer size. From the start many Tutsi had fled spontaneously to the extensive grounds of the Catholic diocese at Kabgayi. Governmental authorities also encouraged and helped Tutsi to assemble there, some of them believing that people at risk were safer at Kabgayi than in their home communes, others because they understood that gathering Tutsi together was part of the genocidal plan. Military and militia never launched an open assault on the extensive camps, but were preparing to do so when the RPF took Kabgayi in early June. (P. 277) An interesting feature of the GTS is that our findings demonstrate this difference: from a random sample of households surveyed in the framework of an agricultural research project before the genocide, we have found that Tutsi members of the surveyed households had a far better chance to survey the genocide when they were living in the prefecture of Gitarama than in Gikongoro. Interestingly, the situation is reversed for Hutu. Hutu living in Gikongoro had a higher chance not to be killed in the genocide or civil war than Hutu living in Gitarama. The latter finding can be explained by the absence of battles between the RPF and the FAR in Gikongoro, which, in turn, is explained by the refusal of the French army to allow the RPF to enter Gikongoro during Operation Turquoise. The survey features only Twa in Gitarama who had the lowest chance to be killed in either the genocide or the civil war.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The data presented in Table 6 seem to suggest that the early arrival of the RPF had a double consequence: some Tutsi were saved, and some Hutu were killed. The regression analysis will check whether this observation can be substantiated. 6 
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6. For a detailed description of massacres committed by the RPF in the prefecture of Gitarama, I refer to Ndahayo (2000, 111-23) . Ndahayo is from Gitarama and served as the executive secretary of the Movement Democratique Republicain (MDR) in 1994 and 1995. He finds that the RPF killed 18,000 people in Gitarama prefecture. This represents 2.2% of a total Hutu population (800,000) in Gitarama at the time of the genocide. Compared to my own estimates, based on the sample of rural households in Gitarama, Ndahayo's estimate seems realistic.
ETHNIC DATA AND THE DOUBLE-GENOCIDE THESIS
To distinguish the killings committed by the Interahamwe and FAR, on one hand, and by the RPF, on the other hand, I will analyze the mortality pattern of the Hutu and Tutsi in my sample. Who was killed by whom? Where did the killings take place? When did they take place? Were whole families killed at the same time in the same place? Were the killings linked to a particular event? What was the identity of the killer and of the victim?
From the household-level data, it is clear that 1 out of 3 Tutsi households in the pregenocide sample lost all of their household members in 1994. Almost the same percentage of Tutsi households lost more than one (but not all) of its members. Of these households (taken together, they account for 15 out of 25 of Tutsi households with data on all members), 11 lost their members on the same day. They were exterminated that day (see Table 7 ).
In comparison, none of the 191 Hutu households with data on all members lost all of its members. Taking households with data missing on some of their members into account, we find that 24 households (8.1% of 295) lost one or more of its members violently. From these descriptive data at the household level, we thus observe a clear ethnic pattern-namely, that many (in our sample 15 out of 25 households) Tutsi residing in Rwanda were killed with their family members, most often on the same day. Although the number of Hutu killed in our sample is high in absolute numbers (43, compared with 79 Tutsi), the large majority of Hutu in our sample (more than 90%) were not killed in the first place. Old age and disease also took their tolls. When murdered, most Hutu killed in the sample were found to be the only casualty in the household. Rarely were members of Hutu households killed on the same day and in the same place. From the data, it is difficult not to conclude that the patterns of killing were different for Tutsi and Hutu. Whatever one's position on the double-genocide thesis (i.e., that both the former regime and the RPF committed genocide), our research in Gikongoro, Gitarama, and Kibuye shows that many people were killed, both Tutsi and Hutu, but the killing pattern in the period between 1994 and 2000 was clearly different for both groups. Simply stated, we physically found and located more than 82% (1,344 out of 1,620) of the members of the Hutu households included in the 1989-1992 agricultural household sample. Of the remaining 17% (276 members), 111 were missing (i.e., their fate is unknown) and 165 were dead. Of these deaths, 112 people were reported to have died a natural death. Regarding the 131 missing (whose ethnicity and living or death status are unknown), it should be pointed out that even panel surveys without the advent of war, large-scale massacres, or mass migration lose households and household members in subsequent rounds of the survey because of individual migration, job search in the city, marriage in another village, and so on. Given Rwanda's recent history, our attrition rate (93%) is very, very high. One may argue that some of these "natural" deaths were, in fact, killed by the RPF. (I have no proof of this, but I am ready to accept some false testimonies.) The number killed by the RPF cannot be that large, however, because, in the course of almost 10 years between the surveys, at least some Hutu in this sample must have died from disease (malaria, AIDS) or old age.
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THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF KILLING
In this section, I examine the places were Hutu and Tutsi were killed in relation to the places were the murdered person was residing before the genocide. In this way, we can trace the spatial distribution of the killing process during the genocide and the civil war. When one or more members from the survey site were killed outside the commune of residence, a line is drawn on the map between the survey site and a small triangle or a small circle (see Figure 2) . A triangle indicates Tutsi deaths, and a circle indicates Hutu deaths. No line was drawn when members of the sample died in their own commune. Take Masango commune in Gitarama prefecture (bordering Kibuye and Gikongoro prefectures), for example: Tutsi members from Masango commune included in the sample were killed in the commune. This is symbolized by the small triangle without a line linking the cross and the triangle. Hutu members from the sample in Masango were killed in the Kibeho camp, in the commune of Rwamiko, Gikongoro prefecture. This is symbolized by the line drawn between the cross indicating the survey site and the small circle in Rwamiko commune indicating the death of Hutu.
Both Hutu and Tutsi were killed inside as well as outside their communes of origin, but more Tutsi than Hutu included in the sample died in their own communes. Fourteen Tutsi from the survey site in Rwamiko commune, for example, were killed in the church of Kibeho. Tutsi from the survey sites who were killed outside their communes of origin mostly died in Butare prefecture. We also found that 5 Tutsi were thrown into the Nyabarongo River. Hutu included in our sample mostly died in Kigali, in a neighboring commune, or in the Congo. To recapitulate, places where Tutsi in our sample were killed include the church of Kibeho, in Kigali, at the place of residence, and in the Nyabarongo River. They all died in 1994. Places were Hutu in our sample were killed include Mukingi (1994) , in the camp of Kibeho (1995 ), in Congo (1996 , and in their place of residence (1997). 
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ANALYSIS OF SURVIVAL CHANCES
In an analysis of survival chances, I want to identify the determinants of a person's probability of surviving the genocide and the civil war. Econometrically, this is done by the use of a logistical regression technique in which the variable at the left-hand side of the equation is a dummy variable capturing the death (1) or life (0) status.
Formally,
with x k = personal, household, and local characteristics. The right-hand side features a number of personal, household, and local variables that explain the life or death status of the individual. One must make a distinction between a "natural" and a "violent" cause of death. Therefore, I first perform a regression using a binary method and, in the next section, a multinomial regression technique.
Explanatory variables include the following: The regressions show that age, sex, and ethnicity strongly determined a person's chances of dying violently in Rwanda during the past decade in all three regressions. In the first regression, in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the event of both a natural and a violent death, the ethnic effect is significant at the 12% level. The significance of the ethnic effect increases strongly in the other two regressions, in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 only in cases of violent death. It is thus clear that Rwandan Tutsi in our sample were killed because of their ethnic affiliation. The regressions also show that women had a better chance of survival than men. The computations of the marginal effects of the variables in the third regression show that sex and ethnicity have the most impact on one's probability of violent death in Rwanda, with the latter effect three times stronger then the first.
The earning of an off-farm income has no significant effect in any of the three regressions. Members of households who owned large land properties, however, had a higher chance of dying violently during the last decade of Rwanda's turbulent history. This means that, apart from ethnicity, other regularities can be observed in the killing process.
The number of days between the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane on April 6, 1994, and the arrival of the RPF on the survey site also has a significant effect. The more days between these dates, the lower one's chances for violent death. This civil war effect, however, is in its turn corrected for when it is interacted with the ethnic variable. The sooner the RPF arrived at the survey site, the fewer Tutsi were killed (the lower the chance of Tutsi to be killed). The marginal effect shows that the probability of Hutu to die violently after the arrival of the RPF decreased by 1% for each month after April 6, 1994. The probability for Tutsi to die violently increased by 2% for each month after April 6, 1994, and when the RPF arrived at the survey site.
7 From the size of the marginal effects, it can be derived that the "Tutsi-saving" effect of the arrival of the RPF at the survey site was two times larger than the "Hutu-killing" effect of that arrival.
I have already mentioned that fewer Hutu died in Gikongoro than in Gitarama because of the late arrival of the RPF in Gikongoro. They were not allowed in by the French Operation Turquoise. Econometrically, it is not easy to account for Operation Turquoise. The data for the arrival of the RPF are specific for each survey site, and they vary for the Gikongoro sites from 139 days (after April 6, 1994) to 270 days. The French arrived in Gikongoro about 85 days after April 6, 1994.
8 One way to capture an effect for Gikongoro that is not observed in Gitarama (and in Kibuye) 9 is to use a dummy variable for Gikongoro. It is, however, not sure if this procedure really corresponds to reality, meaning that the French army was really occupying (and thus stopping the killing) soon after their arrival over the whole area of our survey sites. A dummy can also capture other effects for Gikongoro that we are not aware of. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our analysis, we have introduced a dummy for 8. We cannot replace the dates the RPF arrived at the Gikongoro sites by 85 because then we would no longer distinguish between the effect of the French arrival at Gikongoro sites and the RPF arrival at Gitarama sites.
9. The problem of the arrival of the French versus the arrival of the RPF in Kibuye prefecture in terms of days after April 6, 1994, is very small because it almost coincided.
Gikongoro. It had no significant effect and did not change the effects of the other variables. We can conclude this section saying that the French army saved a number of Hutu lives in Gikongoro by delaying the entry of the RPF in that prefecture, at the cost of a number of Tutsi lives. 10 This analysis shows that the probability of a Hutu being killed by the RPF was higher in 1994 compared with 1995, 1996, or later. What kind of killings were these? Were they revenge killings-revenge in the sense that the RPF killed Interahamwe because the members of that militia killed Tutsi in the days, weeks, or months before the arrival of the RPF? Did the RPF just kill Hutu citizens at random upon their arrival in a survey site? Were RPF killings related to a prior attack?
In our data, we have found that of the 43 Hutu who were killed violently, 21 were killed by the RPF. Of these 21 Hutu, 10 were killed in 1994; 3 of these 10 victims of RPF bullets in 1994 were known as Interahamwe in their cells of residence. They participated actively in the genocide. The other 7 killings cannot be linked with the activities of the victim during the genocide. Two out of 21 were killed in the massacre of the Kibeho refugee camp in 1995, and 5 were killed in 1997 after an infiltration attack by former FAR and Interhamwe in northern Rwanda. In two Hutu households, we have found members killed by the RPF on the same day and in the same place. Apart from the first 3 persons killed in 1994, none of the other victims were known as Interahamwe.
From our fieldwork in Gitarama, Gikongoro, and Kibuye, we conclude that half of the RFP killings cannot be linked to a particular event; a number of RPF killings in these prefectures can be categorized as revenge killings; a number of RPF killings in the sample can be attributed to the massacre in the Kibeho refugee camp (Gikongoro prefecture); and a relatively large number of killings in north Gitarama can be regarded as terror and harm inflicted on the civilian Hutu population after an insurgency by former FAR and Interahamwe.
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The results of the multinomial regression in Table 10 , in which the dependent variable is not a binary choice variable, strengthen the effects already observed in the binary case. They show again that age, sex, and ethnicity have a significant effect on the probability of dying violently. The effect of the land variable in this multinomial regression takes away the ambiguity of land in the binary regression. Landlords indeed have a higher chance of dying violently and a lower chance of dying naturally compared with less landed people. As before, the number of days after April 6, 1994 , that the RPF arrived at the survey sites is also very significant, as is the interaction between this variable and the ethnic variable in the explanation of violent death. The later the RPF arrived at the survey sites, the lower one's probability of dying violently, unless if one were a Tutsi. The effect of the RPF arrival on the probability of dying from a natural cause is somewhat puzzling. The arrival of the RPF at the survey site apparently increased one's probability of dying from disease or illness (natural death). This may have to do with the problem of getting medical treatment during civil war or with the decline of living standards during civil war. In that respect, it is important to note that humanitarian aid organizations complained vigorously during the genocide about the RPF refusal to allow them to deliver aid or assist the needy.
CONCLUSION
In a survey in the prefectures of Gitarama, Gikongoro, and Kibuye, evidence was found of killings of Hutu and Tutsi by Interahamwe, FAR, and RPF. One out of 3 Tutsi households in the pregenocide sample had all its members exterminated in 1994, very often on the same day and in the same place by the same people. Only 2 of the 27 Tutsi households (8.3%) reported no members lost during the genocide. This genocidal pattern is not found in the killings of Hutu household members. From the Hutu households with full information on all members, 91% reported not to have lost members who died violently. Even when a number of false testimonies and missing information on members of Hutu households who stayed or died in Congo are accepted, the pattern of killing of Hutu and Tutsi was clearly different. In effect, we have traced and found, in a material and physical sense, a large majority of Hutu households from the pregenocide sample, including wives and children. This is not the case for most members of Tutsi households. We therefore argue that for those prefectures in which we performed our fieldwork, the term genocide should be reserved for the killings committed by the Interahamwe and the FAR, and another word should be used for the killings committed by the RPF. That word could be massacre or terror or another word, depending on the event. Using regression analysis, it was found that age, sex, ethnic affiliation, the size of one's land, and the number of days it took the RPF to reach the survey site determined one's chance for survival. Older people, men, Tutsi, and land-rich people had a higher probability of dying violently compared with young people, women, Hutu, or landpoor people. More Tutsi survived the genocide and more Hutu died violently the sooner after April 6, 1994 , that the RPF reached the survey site.
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